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The amount of capital required to transition energy systems to low-carbon futures is very large, yet analysis of energy systems
change has been curiously quiet on the role of capitalmarkets in financing energy transitions. This is surprising given the huge role
finance and investment must play in facilitating transformative change. We argue this has been due to a lack of suitable theory to
supplant neoclassical notions of capital markets and innovation finance. This research draws on the notion from Planetary econ-
omics: Energy, climate change and the three domains of sustainable development, by Grubb and colleagues, that planetary
economics is defined by three ‘domains’, which describe behavioural, neoclassical, and evolutionary aspects of energy and cli-
mate policy analysis.We identify first- and second-domain theories of finance that arewell established, but argue that third-domain
approaches, relating to evolutionary systems change, have lacked a compatible theory of capital markets. Based on an analysis of
electricity market reform and renewable energy finance in the UK, the ‘adaptive market hypothesis’ is presented as a suitable
framework with which to analyse energy systems finance. Armedwith an understanding of financial markets as adaptive, scholars
and policy makers can ask new questions about the role of capital markets in energy systems transitions.
Policy relevance
This article explores the role of financial markets in capitalising low-carbon energy systems and long-term
change. Theauthorsdemonstrate thatmuchenergyandclimatepolicyassumesfinancialmarketsareefficient,
meaning they will reliably capitalise low-carbon transitions if a rational return is created by subsidy regimes or
othermarketmechanisms. Theauthors show that themarket for renewableenergy financedoesnot conform to
the efficient markets hypothesis, and is more in line with an ‘adaptive’ markets understanding. Climate and
energy policy makers that design policy, strategy, and regulation on the assumption of efficient financial
markets will not pay attention to structural and behavioural constraints on investment; they risk falling short
of the investment levels needed for long-term systems change. In short, by thinking of financial markets as
adaptive, the range of policy responses to enable low-carbon investment can be much broader.
Keywords: adaptive market hypothesis; efficient markets hypothesis; energy finance; investment; planetary economics
1. Introduction
Nothing is more suicidal than a rational investment policy in an irrational world. (John Maynard
Keynes, quoted in Freidman, Schwartz, & Bernstein, 1965)
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The International Energy Agency (IEA) has estimated that up to US$53 trillion of investment is
required by 2035 to meet projected energy demand within a credible emissions framework (IEA,
2014). In recognising the investment challenge, much scholarship to date has focused on market
incentive tools, such as renewable energy (RE) subsidies (Gross, Blyth, & Heptonstall, 2010;
Wood & Dow, 2011), emissions trading mechanisms (Grubb & Neuhoff, 2006; Hintermann,
2010), and the relative merits of pricing carbon (Aldy & Stavins, 2012; Cetin & Verschuere,
2009; Ellerman, Convery, & De Perthuis, 2010). However, these studies treat the availability of
capital for system transitions as given; if only the right risk and return ratios can be created by
energy policy, low-carbon transitions will present cogent profit opportunities, which finance
capital will exploit. This view is generally reflected in energy policy analysis, where the emphasis
is on supporting low-carbon technologies through the innovation chain to commercialisation, at
which point market mechanisms are expected to drive widespread deployment. This study asks
whether the availability of capital for energy system transition can, in fact, be assumed. It does
so in light of emergent understandings of financial markets as behaviourally and structurally con-
strained, a departure from neoclassical assumptions of markets as efficient resource allocators. The
empirical research focuses on the UK, which has gone furthest in the marketisation of energy infra-
structures. This article explores how the logics of UK energy policy, and wider structural shifts in
the utilities sector and capital markets, are affecting the market for RE finance, and the impli-
cations of this for a low-carbon transition. To frame this analysis, the authors draw on the ‘three
domains of planetary economics’ proposed by Grubb, Hourcade, and Neuhoff (2014), co-evolution-
ary change approaches (Foxon, 2011), and theories of ‘adaptive’ finance (Lo, 2004, 2012; Soufian,
Forbes, & Hudson, 2014).
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical framing of this research. Based on
the ‘three domains’ of sustainable development proposed by Grubb et al. (2014), we argue that estab-
lished literatures exist on the effects of both first- (behavioural and organisational) and second- (neo-
classical/welfare) domain theories on financial markets in the energy transition, but there is a gap in
the literature on third-domain (evolutionary and institutional) treatments of investment and financial
markets. Section 3 comprises the empirical methodology for a study of RE finance in the UK. Section 4
describes the results, identifying structural barriers to RE investment in the UK. In Section 5, these
results are analysed in relation to the adaptive market hypothesis (AMH). The authors argue that
financemarkets for RE in the UK conform to an adaptive (as opposed to efficient) model. Section 6 pre-
sents the conclusions from this study and proposes the AMH as useful for energy research and policy
formation.
2. Financing low-carbon energy investment: theoretical perspectives
Grubb et al. (2014) argue that analysis of the economic responses to the challenges of climate change
requires understanding sustainable development as being constituted by three ‘domains’. Studies that
focus on individual behaviours/cognition are classed as first-domain approaches, those that assume
rational actors and market efficiency are classed as second-domain approaches, and those that
address evolving structural and institutional effects on system change are classed as third-domain
approaches. For Grubb et al. (2014), these three domains are not mutually exclusive, and each has a
2 Hall et al.
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legitimate contribution tomake inunderstanding the political economyof energy transitions. Further-
more, these three domains lead to three complementary pillars of policy responses.
The roles of finance and capital markets are important for the analysis of responses in each domain.
However, we argue that, to date, these roles have been conceptualised largely in relation to first- and
second-domain approaches, and little has been said about the roles of finance/capital markets in the
‘third domain’, which relates to long-term, systemic change. This is important, as Grubb et al.
(2014, p. 428) argue that new types of financial instruments are needed ‘to align the financial
system with the real physical needs for long-term, sustainable investment’. This is critical to energy
and climate policy, as the design of any new financial instruments must operate on assumptions
about how financial markets work.
2.1. Investment challenges: first- and second-domain perspectives
Much climate policy analysis has taken a ‘second domain’ perspective, based on neoclassical and
welfare economics, in which individuals and organisations are rational actors who make optimal
choices based on economic factors. While academic neoclassical economics can envisage short-
term irrationality or inefficiency, this is often framed as market failure, which can be corrected
on a long enough timescale (Malkiel, 2003) if only better markets can be created (Bowman,
Froud, Johal, John, & Leaver, 2014). Thus, the policy prescriptions arising from neoclassical econ-
omics are often a furthering and deepening of markets to shift the good or service being provided
towards more ‘efficient’ provision. These assumptions lead policy makers to pursue market-driven
solutions for the pricing and exchange of societal and planetary resources. If all actors and organ-
isations are rational, a markets and pricing approach, based on sound cost–benefit analysis, will
yield efficient resource allocations (Grubb et al, 2014; Styhre, 2014). Within this domain, policy
research has typically focused on the pricing of environmental externalities, particularly carbon
emissions (Aldy & Stavins, 2012; Baumol, 1972; Ellerman et al., 2010), and the construction of
market mechanisms and trading to deal with them (Neuhoff, Grubb, & Keats, 2006; Harstad &
Eskeland, 2010).
The theories of finance/capital markets most compatible with the second-domain derive from
Eugene Fama’s hypothesis of financial markets as ‘efficient’ (Fama, 1970; Fox, 2011; Soufian et al.,
2014; Styhre, 2014). In the ‘efficient markets hypothesis’ (EMH) an ‘army of [rational] investors’ is
‘driven by profit opportunities’ (Lo, 2004, p. 16) to quickly recognise attractive investments and will
allocate capital to exploit them. This assumes the ‘many’ investors are able to incorporate all available
information, forming rational actors that will (in this case) invest in low-carbon transitions once a
profit opportunity is created. Masini and Menichetti (2012) argue that much western energy policy
implicitly assumes an efficient financial market exists, as evidenced by its reliance on prices and
markets to facilitate energy transitions.
Further work has sought to apply a ‘first domain’ perspective, drawing on behavioural economics
(Pollitt & Shaorshadze, 2011), in which individual and organisations have ‘bounded rationality’, i.e.
there are limits to their ability to gather and process relevant information (Simon, 1955). Simon
(1955) argued that this implies that economic actors primarily seek satisfactory rather than optimal sol-
utions, i.e. they display ‘satisficing’ as opposed to profitmaximisation behaviour. This helps to explain
why nominally rational decisions on energy and resource efficiency are unevenly adopted, even where
Energy finance as an adaptive market 3
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cost-optimal measures exist (see Howarth, Haddad, & Paton, 2000; Marechal & Lazaric, 2011; Pollitt &
Shaorshadze, 2011; Sorrell, 2004).
Here, the compatible theory of capital markets is ‘behavioural finance’ (Shiller, 2003). Masini and
Menichetti (2012, 2013) investigate how investors’ a priori beliefs, subsidy preferences, and appetite
for technological risk, affect renewable energy investment decisions. They find prior beliefs on techno-
logical risk to be more important to investors than perceived effectiveness of existing policies (see also
Leete, Xu, &Wheeler, 2013). Here, policy should pay more attention to investors’ risk perceptions, as
not all investors have sufficient experience of the energy sector to judge risk adequately (Wu¨stenhagen
&Menichetti, 2012). Bergek, Mignon, and Sundberg (2013) focus on non-financial investors, similarly
finding cognitive aspects of technological beliefs, entrepreneurial appetite, and network learning as
important drivers for RE investment. Further work has described how the orientation of business
models affects RE investors’ behaviour (Pinkse & Van Den Buuse, 2012) and how these business
models affect investor preferences beyond conditions of technology attributes and price (Loock, 2012).
These behavioural finance treatments add to our understanding by using ideas of bounded ration-
ality, but do not consider wider systemic changes relating to the ‘third domain’.
2.2. Third domain: (co)evolutionary structural change
The third domain relates to the challenges of strategic investment for innovation and infrastructure,
leading to transformation of energy systems (Grubb et al., 2014). Understanding change in socio-tech-
nical systems for the supply and use of energy has been the focus ofmuch recent research, but we argue
that this has paid insufficient attention to understanding the roles of finance and capital markets.
A co-evolutionary, socio-technical systems approach offers a broad, institutionally focused under-
standing of how innovations such as REenergy technologies proliferate through complex physical
and social systems (Foxon, 2011; Hughes, 1987; Joerges, 1998). This work builds on an evolutionary
economics perspective of systems change arising out of firms with bounded rationality interacting
under selection pressures (Nelson & Winter, 1982), but has tended to emphasise social rather than
economic drivers (Foxon, 2011). Building on these treatments, socio-technical transitions approaches
have described the interplay of actors and processes involved in managing the transition to lower-
carbon systems (Bolton & Foxon, 2013; Verbong & Geels, 2007). Co-evolutionary and socio-technical
framings have been applied to energy systems as they display high levels of interdependencies between
physical assets, societal practices, economic cycles, and technological change (Arapostathis et al.,
2013; Hannon, Foxon, & Gale, 2013; Verbong & Geels, 2007).
Price support measures designed to incentivise investments in RE are classed by Grubb et al. (2014) as a
third-domain policy, as they address the challenge of market under-investment in innovation.
These measures assume that if technologies can be pulled through the innovation chain using subsidy
(Figure 1), to the ‘supported’ or ‘fully’ commercial stages , thenmarketmechanisms will ensure their wide-
spread deployment (Gross et al., 2010; Munoz, Huijben, Verhees, & Verbong, 2014). As such, RE price
support mechanisms (third-domain policy) still operate under an EMH framing (second-domain theory),
as they assume efficient capital markets will recognise and reliably capitalise supported renewables.
Many third-domain treatments analyse how energy innovations permeate through large systems
and how they face barriers beyond simple issues of grid parity (Bergek & Jacobsson, 2003; Foxon
et al., 2005; Jacobsson & Bergek, 2011). The process of technological innovation is non-linear and
4 Hall et al.
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can be affected by institutional factors (Bolton & Foxon, 2015a, 2015b; Foxon et al., 2005, p. 2127;
Grubb, 2004). In the technological innovation systems framework (Markard & Truffer, 2008), mobiliz-
ation of resources (including financial) is a key process. Jacobsson andKarltorp’s (2013) investigation of
onshorewind provides a useful example of the utility of payingmore attention to the realities of energy
transitions finance. However, more work needs to be done to understand how the features of capital
markets influence system transitions and energy/climate policy. Capital markets and finance are
often included as important factors (Geels, 2011; Ku¨nneke, 2008), but remainunexamined as a co-evol-
utionary agent (Hannon et al., 2013; Stephens & Jiusto, 2010).
2.3. Adaptive markets as third-domain theory
Wepropose that a theory of financialmarkets as adaptivemarkets could provide a compatible theory of
finance and capital investment for third-domain analysis of energy systems transformation and policy,
as shown in Figure 2.
Recent work has described the AMH (Lo, 2004), in which learning, competition, and evolutionary
selection pressures govern market actors. Individual agents are again conceptualised as boundedly
Figure 1. Types of investors in the investment chain and the assumption of ‘market pull/market expansion’
Source: Wu¨stenhagen and Menichetti (2012, p. 5).
Notes: FFF, Friends, family and fools.
Energy finance as an adaptive market 5
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rational satisficers (Neely,Weller,&Ulrich, 2009), but structural constraints on investors, aswell as cog-
nitive constraints, are presented as co-productive of a particular investment environment (Soufian
et al., 2014). Lo (2004, 2012) describes the AMH as grounded in evolutionary economics theory
(Nelson & Winter, 1982). This is based on the use of generalised evolutionary principles of variation,
retention, and selection to explain change and stability in economic systems. This is broader than
the notion of market selection used in neoclassical economics, as it takes into account institutional
and structural constraints, behavioural routines, and fundamental uncertainties. Change in economic
systems is shown to be path-dependent and subject to technological and institutional lock-in (Foxon,
2011; Unruh, 2000). This focus on evolutionary principles suggests that ideas of adaptive markets fit
well with the third-domain view of co-evolutionary systems change.
For example, the market for highly liquid, frequently traded assets, for which there are many com-
peting investors andwhere the rules of trading are stable over time (such as government bonds),may be
more efficient than assets for which these attributes are less evident. The AMHproposes that the invest-
ment environment, along with investor behaviour, can change over time; investors’ carefully devel-
oped heuristics must adapt to new realities in periods of turbulence or change (Lo, 2004, 2012;
Soufian et al., 2014). Thus, the external influence of a structural change, such as the financial crisis,
necessitates changes in the environment that investors operate within, forcing investor behaviours
and associated institutions to evolve or face extinction. As such, there are two forces acting against
the establishment and reproduction of an ‘efficient’ capital market: investor cognition and structural
change, both of which co-evolve to produce the capital markets for a given asset at a given point in
time.
Whilst a crisis is an obvious agent of structural change, a changing subsidy regime for RE technol-
ogies, new financial regulation, and/or technological innovation can all change the structure of the
market. How financial markets adapt through the evolution of new structures, institutions, and
Figure 2. The three domains and their compatible theories of finance and capital
6 Hall et al.
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behaviours to deal with change and exploit new opportunities has not been well studied in this
context. Lo (2012, p. 14) states that market efficiency is not an ‘all-or-nothing condition but a conti-
nuum, one that depends on the relative proportion of market participants [which changes over
time]’. For energy technology finance, which is characterised by large, lumpy investments amortised
over several political and even economic cycles (Grubb et al., 2014), we might expect the EMH to be
much less strong. During the time it takes to draw profit from generation assets, there may be signifi-
cant changes in governments, policy, societal preferences, technology alternatives, financial vehicles,
and market regulation. Thus, we would expect the AMH to better describe capital markets for energy
finance under four conditions:
1. Investors in energy are boundedly rational.
2. The energy investment environment (policy, regulation, incentives, technology characteristics/
options, etc.) changes over time, forcing incumbent firms and investors to adapt to new conditions.
3. The structures of financial vehicles and wider capital markets affect the submarkets of energy
finance.
4. These behavioural, environmental, and structural characteristics co-evolve, so individuals, firms,
and institutions active in the energy investment space enter and exit over time, characterising a tur-
bulent market for energy finance.
First-domain, behavioural theories are making substantive contributions to our understanding of
energy finance and the behaviours of individual investors. The insights of the behavioural finance
school have satisfied condition (1) (see Energy Policy, 40, 1–120). In Section 5, we analyse recent devel-
opments in the UK electricity sector through the lens of the AMH and investigate whether conditions
(2), (3), and (4) have been satisfied.
3. Study of RE investment in UK energy systems
Our empirical study examined the investment system for RE generation technologies in the UK, in the
light of the UK Electricity Market Reform (EMR, DECC, 2012), enacted in the Energy Act 2013 (Great
Britain, 2013).
RE investment studies have utilised deductive approaches based on questionnaire designs and
hypothesis testing, focusing on cognitive factors (Loock 2012; Masini & Menichetti, 2012, 2013).
Our research aimed to elicit new knowledge about the factors beyond individual/firm cognition that
constrain or enable energy investors. Leete et al. (2013) describes an inductive approach, based on
in-depth narrative as suitable for the purpose of abstracting hypotheses. Equally, in-depth qualitative
engagement with investors is a recognised methodology for understanding the complexities of RE
investment (BNEF, 2013; Nelson & Pierpont, 2013). Where AMH scholars have often utilised large-n
statistical methods to test market efficiency based on rapidly traded commodities (Kim, Shamsuddin,
& Lim, 2009; Neely et al., 2009), this would be impossible for RE finance as no publicly quoted
exchange or secondary market currently exists. As such, in-depth qualitative methods are used.
The primary data comprise 16 in-depth interviews from across the RE investment chain: five insti-
tutional RE investment professionals or fund managers, three utility executives, two independent
Energy finance as an adaptive market 7
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RE project developers, two alternative RE finance providers, two public-sector policy professionals,
and two institutional finance NGO representatives (these are marked a to e to distinguish between
individuals from the same group). These actors from across the investment chain enabled a detailed
investigation of investment issues. Interviews were conducted between January 2013 and December
2013.
The interviews investigated the sources of RE finance that have been drawn on and those that could
be further drawn on, what mechanisms enable/constrain financiers to allocate capital to RE assets, the
effects of the financial crisis, market regulation, energy policy, and institutional/individual behaviour.
Through a process of coding and narrative analysis, key discourses and themes were extracted. We
found a high level of consistency in relation to these themes across our sample.
4. Developing the third domain: co-evolutionary dynamics in UK energy investment
4.1. UK energy policy context
In 2010 the UK government instigated the EMR, which was explicitly designed to incentivise higher
levels of private-sector investment in low-carbon generation, covering both renewables and new
nuclear power (DECC, 2012). EMR was implemented in the Energy Act 2013 (Great Britain, 2013).
EMR incorporates three main features: feed-in tariffs (FiTs) with contracts for difference (CfDs) for
low-carbon generation; capacity markets for security of supply; and regulatory institutional frame-
works for both. This is informed by a long-term vision in which the main goal is a period of price
support followed by a declining role for government as low-carbon generation technologies ‘get to a
level of maturity where they are able to compete on a level playing field’ (DECC, 2012, p. 25 [our
emphases]). This level playing field is widely understood as a levelised cost of electricity supply com-
parable with existing technologies. EMR is designed so that the ‘market pull’ (Figure 1) is strong
enough to expand the use of renewable technologies to a point where economies of scale, learning
effects, process efficiencies, or price effects from elsewhere in the system bring costs towards grid
parity.
4.2. Investment trends and stakeholders
The absolute volumes of capital held by banks, utilities, and institutional investors are more than suf-
ficient for energy transitions (Blyth, McCarthy, & Gross, 2014; Nelson & Pierpont, 2013). However,
concerns have recently been raised over how much of the transition can be financed by incumbent
actors, mainly utilities and banks, within the energy sector (IEA, 2014; Mitchell, 2014; Nelson & Pier-
pont, 2013). For UK RE investment, BNEF (2012) analysis shows rapidly declining rates of investment
by the ‘Big Six’ large energy firms, after a peak of £3 billion in 2011 (Figure 3).
There is also a large proportion of non-utility finance capitalising renewables in the UK (Blyth et al.,
2014; BNEF, 2012). Where this has and may come from in the future is a key concern for UK energy
policy (DECC, 2012):
half has come from the balance sheets of the utility companies and the other half has come frombanks,
project finance from banks. The investment community haven’t really hadmuch of a look in. [ . . . ] The
8 Hall et al.
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twomainways that infrastructure has been financed so far are companies building infrastructure them-
selves using their own funds, so on balance sheet, and then the other way is project finance where you
create an entity specifically for the project and you seek to finance that project directly. (Institutional RE
investment professional, 2013a)
Hence, project finance, where developers set up a special purpose vehicle (SPV) and then go to debt and
equity markets to raise finance, has mainly come from bank debt. In project finance, lenders loan
money to projects based on that project’s risks and future cash flows, and lenders have little/no
claims on the assets of the parent company (Groobey, Pierce, Faber, & Broome, 2010). The future feasi-
bility of both utility and project finance is crucial to low-carbon energy transitions because they struc-
ture the ability of traditional actors to finance new RE capacity.
4.3. Constrained capital availability
Interview respondents described a need forUK energy policy to draw in new types of financial investors
to capitalise renewable generation assets. Three narrativeswere identified from the primary sample and
secondary sources (see also Jacobsson & Karltorp, 2013):
1. The insufficiency of utility company balance sheets to finance the transition/the changing role of
utilities
2. A reduction in long-term project debt available from banks
3. How together these issues culminate in the need for energy policy to attract new participants in RE
finance
Figure 3. ‘Big Six’ capacity investment 2006–2014 (£ million)
Source: BNEF (2012, p. 8).
Notes: Includes all projects under construction at the start of 2012.
Energy finance as an adaptive market 9
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These changes to the wider landscape of RE finance are happening alongside new subsidy regimes
and market reforms. The following sections investigate how the co-evolution of energy policy and
market structure has affected both the volume of capital available for the sector and the velocity
with which it can be recycled through institutions wishing to adopt positions in the RE space.
4.3.1. Utility balance sheets
The balance sheet financing of new renewables bymajor UK and European utilities is constrained in two
ways (Blyth et al., 2014). First, post-crisis reductions in demand undermined the profitability of utilities.
Second, utilitieshaveaccumulateddebt,whichwas raised tofinancemerger and acquisitionactivity after
market liberalisation. High debt levels and low profitability mean that an expansion of utility capital
expenditure in the short term is unlikely, as utilities endeavour to retain strong credit ratings:
typically utilities would have a big balance sheet and they would make the investments themselves,
they would not even go to the finance market to raise financing, [ . . . ] I think that has shifted
because they have either had to reduce debt in their balance sheet and have had to come out and
look for partners with whom to put equity . . . (Institutional RE investment professional, 2013e)
These constraints have led to a period of divestment, in which utilities ‘deleverage’ balance sheets by
selling operational assets to institutional investors (Ernst & Young, 2013). Some respondents argued
that this means a new role for utilities, whose business model must shift from asset owner to developer
and operator. This echoes calls for shifts in utility business models from asset owner to asset manager
(Ernst & Young, 2013, pp. 18–19; also BNEF, 2012; Nelson & Pierpont, 2013). Utilities, however, have
misgivings:
The challengewould be that if youhave taken all the risk, you’ve got the reward for that phase . . . you’ve
taken it through that phase and like you said it’s just sitting on your balance sheet, you finance it off;
Can you get the reward? In the past the reward has been running that station for the next 20–30
years. [ . . . ] We in the energy industry are used to working with that and for twenty years at least it
was reasonably stable. I’m not quite sure that it is at the moment or where it is headed. That worries
us . . . (Utility executive, 2013c)
4.3.2. Long-term project finance
RE project finance from traditional sources is also under significant constraint. Our sample described
the RE project finance model as being hitherto dominated by bank project finance with relatively
low equity stakes by industry equity partners:
Wind farms, the first one got funded in 2007, just before the climate got tough. It was an onshore wind
farmwith high wind speeds NES, the American utility put up the equity, Barclays bank put up the debt,
in those days Barclays bank was prepared to lend 18 year money and it was a beautiful world in many
ways. (RE developer, 2013a)
10 Hall et al.
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The banks, on the debt financing side is quite challenging [ . . . ] the crisis has hadmaybe an impact prob-
ably on the availability of debt finance, where it’s relatively concentrated in a small number of banks. It
is also much more challenging to get long term financing for the life of the asset, so the banks don’t
really want to lend on any proposition much longer than 5–7 years. So the availability of 15–20 yr
money for RE projects is gone. (Institutional RE investment professional, 2013c)
These responses describe a reduction in the availability of long-term project finance from commercial
banks based on the reduction of liquidity in the banking sector. Standard and Poor’s (2013) predict an
increase in debt issuance in the project finance industry; there is no guarantee this will translate to UK
RE investment. At first, liquidity was reduced by the effects of the financial crisis; more recently, the
restraint on bank liquidity is structurally prescribed by the Basel 3 regulations. Basel 3 was a response
of the G20 nations to the tacit state underwriting of the banking sector, setting limits on the leverage
ratios of banks (PWC, 2012). The effect of this is the need for banks to repair their own balance sheets
(PWC, 2012).
4.3.3. Need to attract new sources of finance
There is a scarcity of traditional project and balance sheet finance. This is on top of an existing shortfall
in annual capital expenditure sufficient to meet low-carbon transitions. These capital constraints are
key concerns in both in the stakeholder literature (Ernst & Young, 2013; PWC, 2012) and across our
respondents. This is incompatible with innovation policy that assumes an efficient market will capita-
lise technologies with demonstrable rates of return as market maturity or even a ‘supported commer-
cial’ stage is reached. This constraint has led to a realisation that non-traditional investment actors
must be brought into the RE investment space:
private equity is a different option, [ . . . ] basically taking private investors, large high net worth inves-
tors or they’re taking institutional money and then deploying it, so these guys are part of filling the gap
here (Alternative RE finance provider, 2013a)
the banks who currently do manage project finance aren’t going to be able to do it so the mainstream
investment community is going to be looked to (Institutional RE investment professional, 2013a [our
emphasis])
These changes in the structure of wider capital markets and their effect on the energy investment space
are a broad shift in the ‘rules of the game’ in capital markets, which have filtered into the energy space
and caused an adaptive search for new institutions and actors.
4.4. Filling the finance gap, the ‘mainstream investment community’
With utilities deleveraging at the same time as project finance from commercial banks became scarce,
the challenge for energy policy is to attract new forms of finance into the RE space. This would involve
project-level financing from ‘institutional money’ or the ‘investment community’, which comprises
funds managing private wealth, insurance funds, pension funds, and sovereign wealth funds. As this
has been uncommon in the UK energy sector, the challenge for UK policy makers was described as
designing a support framework that could bring in large sources of capital, by matching the
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characteristics of energy subsidy with risk and return characteristics familiar to institutional investors
(BNEF, 2012, p. 22).
TheUK government’s EMR (DECC, 2012, 2013a; Energy Act 2013; Great Britain, 2013) is the primary
energy policy, designed to ‘make sure the UK remains a leading destination for investment in low-
carbon electricity’ (DECC, 2013b). The government recognised the above discourse on capital con-
straints, explaining ‘the current market arrangements will not deliver this investment, therefore
EMR provides the tools needed to meet the challenge’ (DECC, 2012, p. 12). The previous market
arrangements for RE capacity were renewables obligation certificates (ROCs), which comprise tradable
green certificates for renewable generation,whichprovided additional but uncertain revenue to renew-
able developers beyond themarket price of that energy (Wood&Dow, 2011). The ROC regimewas seen
as contributing to perceptions of the UK renewablesmarket as ‘high risk’, particularly as final prices for
renewable generation were subject to ROC and wholesale electricity price fluctuations (Gross et al.,
2010;Wood&Dow, 2011). Themove away from a tradable certificates approach for subsidising renew-
able generation, towards a FiT-type approach (with CfDs), is one of the keystone policies of EMR,
designed to reduce price risks by providing greater certainty in order to attract new investors into
the RE space (Redpoint, 2010).
FiTs socialise price risks by guaranteeing the subsidy support price for the output of a given technol-
ogy (Gross et al., 2010; Mitchell, Bauknecht, & Connor, 2006). This guarantees the final payments for
low-carbon electricity generated using ‘strike prices’ with CfDs (DECC, 2012). Generators are paid the
difference between the ‘strike price’ and the ‘reference price’, which is a measure of the averagemarket
price. The FiT makes up the difference and levies the cost on consumer bills. This eliminates both the
risks of the support mechanism price being defined by a relative scarcity of tradable certificates, and
wholesale price risk:
the FIT is potentially 15 years, [ . . . ] in principle the idea, what EMR could produce is fundamentally
something that could be quite attractive to the UK defined benefit pension plans if structured in the
right way. (Institutional RE investment professional, 2013c)
The construction of EMR was, as one government representative explicitly stated, directly aimed at
structuring the energy subsidy regime to bring in new types of capital into the UK RE space. The
extent to which this proves to be the case in practice will be seen, as these new support mechanisms
come into force.
4.5. New entrants and structural barriers
Beyond the effects of policy supports, market regulation and capital constraint, respondents identified
further structural factors which meant that the market for energy finance did not conform to the
assumption, that an ‘army of investors’ (Lo, 2004) awaits to capitalise clear profit opportunities.
Respondents described an immature investment community for RE assets, because direct financing
of renewable generation has historically been done by banks and utilities. The result is an investment
community in the UK that is unfamiliar with a complex sector:
. . . there’s a relatively small group of specialists who spend their time worrying about the EMR [ . . . ]
there’s a few advisors, probably a half dozen advisors, half a dozen banks and half a dozen equity
12 Hall et al.
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analyst teams, and once you’re outside of that sphere the level of knowledge tends to be pretty low
(Institutional RE investment professional, 2013b)
There’s lots of ports in the world, there’s lots of airports, there’s lots of toll roads, these are a pretty well
established asset classwhere things are benchmarked across countries. Renewables are still pretty imma-
ture and so as we try and expand the investor universe you’re growing a skill base at the end of the day.
(Institutional RE investment professional, 2013b)
The need to grow a skill base of an investment community is the first structural constraint that requires
adaptive processes to occur.
A second structural constraint relates to the long-term nature of these investments:
So if you’re an investor like us and you have lots of retail investors who feel that they can put their
money in and take their money out whenever they want, we can’t just lock all the money up in a
private equity project. We also have regulatory barriers to how much private equity we can invest
anyway in these kinds of funds, but we just can’t lock that money up like that because our customers
might say we want our money back and we can’t because we invested it in this ten year project or
this 15 year CfD vehicle. So the main way that project finance works at the moment doesn’t really
work for most investors because it’s not liquid. (Institutional RE investment professional, 2013a)
The constraint of illiquidity, alongside the long-termism of RE asset finance, was cited as a structural
barrier for insurance fund investors and by private fund managers. For pension funds, our sample
identified the ‘investment chain’ as a problematic structural constraint. Although the liabilities of
pension funds are long-term, and notionally match up with the kinds of amortisation periods of RE
assets, the timeframes of the fund managers that deploy pension fund assets are much shorter. Inter-
viewees described an investment chain in which pension fund trustees choose what percentages
they wish to allocate to ‘infrastructure’ as a broad asset class. The fund manager then has the choice
of which infrastructure instruments to make. Although the pension fund’s objectives are long-term,
fund manager’s objectives often are not:
the incentive structures verymuch push short termism, so the fundmanagers in the city fundmanage-
ment firms, that have big contracts from the pension schemes know that individually that if they don’t
out perform an index, if they don’t do very well in the short term then those contracts are going to be in
peril, their jobs ultimately and then bonuses certainly [ . . . ]. So there’s massive financial incentives at
the individual and the firm level to privilege the short term over the long term. (Institutional finance
NGO representative, 2013a)
Both pension funds and insurance funds have structural constraints on ability to allocate capital directly
toRE that are unrelated to thepure returnof the investment, but ratheron its ability to characterise liquid
investments and existing revenues. These structural conditions are also identified by the Kay review
(2012) and the World Economic Forum (2011). Blyth et al. (2014) propose dealing with the liquidity
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issue by creating a secondary market for long-term infrastructure assets (see also House of Commons,
2014). Our sample identified a particular lack of secondary market vehicles available in the sector:
it’s a real bleeding edge.Wehaven’t seen any securitised bond issues in this space, therewas some breeze
bonds a few years ago which didn’t work very well, but we haven’t really seenmuch of a growth in this.
So, it could be three or four years before we start to see a significant flow of these investment opportu-
nities. Once that happens it will then take a little while, there will be a few early adopters and then the
markets will gradually get educated into doing it. It will happen but it could well take the best part of a
decade before themainstream investment community is a big funder and that timeline is rather behind
what is probably needed in a UK context. (Institutional RE investment professional, 2013a)
Taken together, the issues of an immature sector, structural constraints on allocating to RE, and a lack of
investment vehicles mean that the assumption of a readily available stream of investment capital to
finance the UK’s energy transition appears less valid. In the next section, we propose that the theory
of adaptive markets provides a better description of these characteristics than the EMH.
5. Analysing an adaptive market and co-evolutionary dynamics
5.1. Application of AMH to UK energy systems
We now argue that the four conditions above have been shown to be satisfied in our study of drivers of
investment inUK energy systems. As stated in Section 2.3, condition (1) was fulfilled by thework of the
behavioural finance school and is supported by the responses of actors in our study. For condition (2),
where the energy investment environment changes over time, forcing incumbents to adapt, utility
consolidation constrained the RE investment environment, forcing incumbent firms and investors
to adapt to new conditions. For condition (3), where changes in wider financial markets affected
energy finance, the financial crisis affected utility balance sheet strength, but also constrained the
other traditional method of RE investment, that of bank project finance. Condition (3) was fulfilled
by demonstrating how the financial crisis and subsequent constraints on bank leverage ratios consti-
tuted a shift in the ‘rules of the game’ in capital markets, which have filtered into the energy space
and caused an adaptive search for new institutions and actors. Thus conditions (2) and (3) are fulfilled,
as policy support, market regulation, and capital constraint force incumbent actors to adapt. Con-
dition (4) suggested behavioural, environmental, and structural characteristics would co-evolve so
that individuals, firms, and institutions would enter and exit the energy investment space over
time, characterising a turbulent market for energy finance. This condition is also fulfilled as new and
incumbent actor behaviours are structuredby each other, and co-evolve alongsidenewpolicy and regu-
latory frameworks and other financial market structures. Structural changes to the market for energy
finance brought in new actors, and three key structural issues – lack of a mature community of inves-
tors, mismatches between investment and fund manager timescales, and lack of suitable investment
vehicles – are forcing actors to adapt and experiment with new mechanisms of allocating capital
finance to UK renewables.
Conditions (1) to (4) are thus supported for the case of investment in RE technologies in the UK. The
capital markets for energy finance are illiquid, characterised by lumpy investments, subject to shifting
policy and regulatory constraints, are composed of incumbent and new actors, and require substantive
14 Hall et al.
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structural and institutional change to sufficiently finance RE transitions. RE finance in the UK does not
describe an ‘efficient’ market of rational actors waiting at the end of the innovation chain to finance
energy transitions. An adaptive markets approach is a more powerful tool for understanding the oper-
ations of capital markets in relation to energy policy.
By adopting an adaptive markets approach, we can strengthen behavioural critiques of perfect
rationality with an understanding that structural constraints manifestly affect the ‘action space’
(Foxon, 2013) in which investors operate. This explains how changes to energy policy, market regu-
lation, capital availability, and financial crises create external structural constraints that complement
the internal behavioural constraints on investors’ cognition and decision making identified from be-
havioural economics analysis. Furthermore, this enables researchers to analyse how external con-
straints co-evolve with cognitive elements.
The critiques from behavioural finance require energy policy to deal with investors’ perceptions of
RE risk (Chassot, Hampl, &Wu¨stenhagen, 2014;Wu¨stenhagen&Menichetti, 2012). This analysis of RE
finance describes a sector that learns from and adapts to changing environments gradually. This adap-
tive behaviour is far more aligned with an evolutionary perspective, where changes in the wider
environment force changes in learnt behaviours, providing adaptive, contingent responses to the per-
formance of complex, long-term investment commitments. We argue that this picture of adaptive
financial markets can bring back an evolutionary economics perspective into co-evolutionary analyses
of long-term energy systems change that had largely focused more on social rather than economic
drivers of change (Foxon, 2011).
Armedwith anunderstanding of financialmarkets as adaptive, we candescribe a temporal risk that is
underappreciated in current energy policy and is relevant to all liberalised energy markets. The risk is
that if energy policy assumes the existence of efficient markets, then policy may not provide the con-
ditions for finance capital to adapt quickly enough to capitalise energy investment in time for a mean-
ingful transition to a decarbonised electricity system. By adopting an AMH framing, it is possible to ask
new questions about the role of capital markets in systems transitions.
6. Conclusion
This article argues that energy finance can be better described as an adaptive, rather than efficient
market. We suggest that this framing provides a more suitable theoretical toolkit with which to
build future energy policy. Indeed, we argue that current energy policy operates paradoxically, in
that it tries to solve third-domain issues (under-investment in innovation and decarbonisation) with
policy based on second-domain assumptions (market efficiency).
This study proposes that the adaptive market hypothesis (AMH) is far more compatible with the
existing literatures on transformational change. This would place the AMH as a compatible theory
of capital markets within Grubb et al’s (2014) ‘third domain’ of planetary economics. Although this
study has focused on electricity market reform in the UK, we contend that assessing the financial
element of energy/climate policy across the three domains would encourage policy makers and scho-
lars in diverse fields to take account of behavioural effects (first domain), pricing frameworks and
market design (second domain), and structural barriers (third domain) when designing policy that
relies on the mobilisation of large and diverse sources of financial capital. By adopting an adaptive
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markets approach, the range of questions researchers and the policy community can ask of the role of
financial markets is greatly increased. These include: How diverse is the investor community that is to
be called upon to finance system change? How intense is competition in this system? What are the
macro- and meso-level structural constraints on financial market agency? What are the mechanisms
best suited to your target investors? Put simply, we can ask whether our energy and climate policies
are rational strategies for an irrational world.
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